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The role of roles in risk management change: the case of an Italian bank 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the role of roles (i.e. groups of actors characterised by the same 
functional tasks within an organization), and of their interactions, within processes of change 
in risk management. By combining insights from the literature on risk management and from 
institutional studies, this paper suggests that change in risk management can be interpreted as 
a process that involves both enabling and precipitating dynamics [Greenwood, R. & Hinings, 
C. R. (1996). Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bringing Together the Old and 
the New Institutionalism. The Academy of Management Review, 21(4), pp. 1022-1054] 
between different roles. Aiming to address these dynamics empirically, we rely on a 
longitudinal case study of an Italian bank. The study shows that the interactions between 
roles were dependent on their respective specific interests, the different institutional templates 
they supported, and the shifts in power for control over relevant information. These dynamics 
both affected and were affected by the change in the template-in-use within the bank and 
allowed a sort of risk management ideal (i.e. the search for more risk management) to persist 
over evolving templates.  
 
Keywords: risk management, change, roles, Italian bank 
 
Jel descriptors: M40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 1 of 44
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rear
European Accounting Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
2 
 
1. Introduction  
The Cadbury Code (1992) and the COSO report (1992) are two building blocks that have 
given rise to a lively debate on corporate governance and risk worldwide (Miller, Kurunmäki, 
& O’Leary, 2008). Since the 1990s, this debate has been further fuelled by subsequent 
regulations (see the Turnbull report, 1999; the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; the Combined 
Code, 2003), as well as by various episodes of corporate failure and managerial misconduct 
(such as Enron and WorldCom), which have ‘ensured the centrality of risk management to 
corporate governance debates probably for decades to come’ (Miller et al., 2008, p. 943).  
In this context, the past twenty years have seen a shift in the understanding of risk 
management, moving from a narrow financially-focused perspective to a broad ‘managerial 
concept’ (Power, 2007, p. 3). Indeed, risk management has been defined as a set of processes 
and techniques that are both explicitly aligned with mechanisms of internal control for 
accountability (Spira & Page, 2003) and fully integrated with operational activities and 
corporate strategies (e.g. Collier & Berry, 2002; Beasley & Frigo, 2010). This enterprise-
wide concept of risk management encompasses ‘ideas of holistic, integrated and business risk 
management’ (Power, 2007, p. 67) and has become widely shared across different sectors. A 
number of models for measuring risks (Kaplan, 2009) and for linking risk with performance 
(Beasley, Chen, Nunez, & Wright, 2006) and risk with strategy (Beasley & Frigo, 2007) have 
been proposed, along with new roles and organizational structures to manage risk (Mikes, 
2008). Hence the international debate and practice on risk management have increasingly 
concentrated on prescriptions regarding how to design effective risk management (Paape & 
Specklé, 2012), thus allowing companies to be publicly acknowledged as ‘good 
organizations’ (Scheytt, Soin, Sahlin-Andersson, & Power, 2006, p. 1335).  
However, as demonstrated by the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the 
proliferation of risk management regulations, prescriptions and recommendations has not 
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necessarily resulted in successful risk management at an organizational level. In many cases, 
the prevailing ‘legitimacy-driven style of risk management’ (Power, 2009, p. 854), as well as 
the overreliance on quantitative models (see Rebonato, 2007), have prevented companies 
from adopting risk management beyond the mere search for legitimacy, and from fully 
embedding risk information into strategic decision-making processes (Magnan & Markarian, 
2011). Also, as effectively stated by Huber and Scheytt (2013, p. 89), ‘the rhetoric of risk 
management lured the public into a false sense of security with regard to the actual risks 
being taken’. 
Nevertheless, risk management recommendations and prescriptions are still core 
concerns of companies, regulators and standard setters, who are reacting to the apparent 
failure of these prescriptions by seemingly searching for ‘more of the same’ (Huber & 
Scheytt, 2013, p. 89). Although worldwide episodes of risk management dysfunction 
continue to take place, ‘yet the ideal of risk management has survived’ (Mikes, 2011, p. 226). 
This apparent contradiction calls for more research inside organizations in order to grasp the 
evolving internal (intra-organizational) dynamics, that can affect the day to day practice of 
risk management.  
Recent studies have explored the actual processes through which risk management 
prescriptions are put in place in specific organizational settings (see Mikes, 2009; 2011; 
Woods, 2009; 2011; Arena, Arnaboldi, & Azzone, 2010; Mikes, Hall, & Millo, 2013). 
Although some of these studies have searched for the different calculative cultures (Mikes, 
2009) and rationales (Arena et al., 2010) to explain the heterogeneity of risk management 
across organizations, the overall process of risk management change deserves further 
investigation. More specifically, recent research has explored how different actors deal with 
risk within organizations (see Power, 2005b; 2007; Mikes, 2008; Arena et al., 2010), but the 
role of roles (here defined as the groups of actors characterised by the same functional tasks 
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inside the organization) during processes of risk management change has been overlooked by 
the literature.  
This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring risk management change inside 
organizations, as well as the role of roles within this process. In so doing, we interpret risk 
management change as resulting from the ongoing interplay between external pressures and 
intra-organizational dynamics, and we investigate whether and how the patterns of interaction 
between different roles (such as management accountants, risk experts, top managers, and 
directors) influence and are influenced by risk management change.  
To achieve this goal, we rely upon a case study in the banking sector, which provides 
an ideal setting for the purpose of our study for several reasons. Firstly, although norms and 
frameworks for corporate governance and risk management have recently affected all sectors, 
banks have struggled with the challenges involved in complying with these norms for longer 
(Euske & Riccaboni, 1999; Soin & Scheytt, 2008; Wahlström, 2009). Therefore, the banking 
sector allows us to explore processes of risk management change over an extended period of 
time. Moreover, risk management within banks has been strongly affected by the evolution of 
external regulations, thus allowing us to clearly identify some of the main external pressures 
for change and their development over time. Finally, risk within banks is acknowledged as 
being an integral part of their core business (Deloitte, 2011), and hence is more likely to 
become embedded into internal dynamics of change. 
Using a longitudinal case study approach (Pettigrew, 1990; Scapens, 2004), we 
collected data from an Italian bank, namely Banca Valle
1
, which is one of the major banks in 
Italy in terms of market share and number of branches. To interpret the process of change in 
risk management within the bank, we drew on insights from institutional studies (see 
Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008), and in particular on the framework proposed 
                                                            
1
 Banca Valle is a pseudonym used for reasons of confidentiality. 
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by Greenwood and Hinings (1993; 1996), as well as on recent literature concerning risk 
management. In so doing, we did not attempt to test institutional theory, but rather insights 
from this theory were adopted to support our interpretation of risk management change 
within the case study. Although our results concern a single organization, and therefore are 
not meant to be generalizable, our analysis nonetheless shows that risk management change 
can be understood by exploring how external pressures towards ‘institutional templates’ (i.e. 
structures and systems that embody ideas and assumptions originated in the broader 
institutional context – see Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) are filtered through intra-
organizational dynamics between roles within organizations.  
By combining theoretical with empirical insights, this paper offers a twofold 
contribution. Firstly, whereas various studies have explored the intra-organizational dynamics 
of risk management (Mikes, 2009; Arena et al., 2010; Woods, 2011), there is still a lack of 
research into how these dynamics actually evolve over time. Our paper adds to the existing 
literature by shedding light on long-term processes of risk management change. Secondly, we 
contribute to the understanding of the apparent contradiction between the shortcomings of 
risk management in practice and the growing interest in and aspiration towards more risk 
management (Huber & Scheytt, 2013). In this respect, we show how organizations respond to 
new external prescriptions beyond (and despite) the apparent failure of these prescriptions. In 
particular, our evidence suggests that intra-organizational dynamics between roles may boost 
awareness of risk management and may help this awareness to permeate strategic planning 
processes within and across different institutional templates at work inside an organization. 
These intra-organizational dynamics may let a sort of risk management ideal (i.e. the search 
for more risk management – see Mikes, 2011) to persist over evolving risk management 
structures and systems at the micro-level of organizations. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section two we present the 
theoretical constructs of the study derived from institutional theory, and in particular from the 
insights offered by the Greenwood and Hinings’ (1993; 1996) framework, as well as from the 
literature on risk management. In section three we describe the research methodology. 
Section four discusses the process of risk management change within Banca Valle, in the 
light of the theoretical constructs depicted in section two. Finally, section five summarizes 
the main findings and concludes by acknowledging the contributions made and the study 
limitations, as well as offering suggestions for future research. 
2. Exploring risk management change: an institutional approach 
In previous decades, institutional theories have strongly influenced management and 
accounting research into organizational change (for a review see Moll, Burns, & Major, 
2006). In an attempt to offer a comprehensive view with which to interpret the interplay 
between external forces and intra-organizational dynamics of change, Greenwood and 
Hinings (1993; 1996) proposed an overarching framework to depict organizational change. In 
this framework, organizational change is interpreted in terms of shifts between different 
institutionalised ‘templates’ or ‘archetypes’, defined as ‘structures and systems that 
consistently embody a single interpretive scheme, made up of ideas, beliefs and values’ 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1993, p. 1055). These templates originate from the external 
environment, and external pressures towards certain templates are filtered through 
‘precipitating’ and ‘enabling’ intra-organizational dynamics within organizations.  
Precipitating dynamics include ‘interest dissatisfaction’ and ‘value commitments’, and 
represent potential pressures for change. For example, a ‘radical change’ (i.e. the movement 
from one template-in-use to another) may happen if a group of actors is dissatisfied about 
how its interests are realized and recognizes the possibility of an alternative template, which 
could improve its level of satisfaction. In this situation, ‘competitive commitment’ (i.e. a 
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pattern of value commitment within which some groups adhere to a template that differs from 
the template-in-use) is likely to lead to organizational change as the group of actors who is 
dissatisfied begins to question the ‘organizational assumptions of how things are done’ 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996, p. 1036).  
Enabling dynamics comprise ‘power dependencies’ and ‘capacity for action’, and 
constitute the dynamics that can effectively facilitate or constrain change. The prevailing 
template in an organization may give power (i.e. in terms of ‘access to and control over key 
decision processes’ – Greenwood & Hinings, 1996, p. 1038) to some groups and not to 
others: when this is recognized, the less satisfied groups will try to promote an alternative 
template to gain more power. However, power dependencies do not necessarily imply a 
situation of conflict. Indeed, the presence of potential conflicts will depend on how the 
templates are introduced and accepted within the organization. For change to take place, the 
shift in the distribution of power should be combined with the capacity of a particular group 
to act (i.e. the capacity for action, defined as the ‘ability to manage the transition process 
from one template to another’ - Greenwood & Hinings, 1996, p. 1039). This capacity is 
linked to both the availability and mobilization of technical and managerial capabilities on 
the part of the different actors. 
The theoretical approach described above may be useful to understand processes of 
risk management change in the banking sector, within which intra-organizational dynamics 
have been found to be the main cause of heterogeneity in risk management between banks 
(Mikes, 2009; 2011). The insights offered by Greenwood and Hinings (1996) also allow us to 
capture and interpret both internal dynamics and external pressures during processes of risk 
management change.  
2.1 Risk management templates  
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According to Mikes (2009), in their attempts to respond to changing external pressures and 
requirements, banks have been converging towards four risk management ‘ideal types’. More 
specifically, ‘risk silo management’ and ‘integrated risk management’ originated from the 
pressures exerted by international regulations on bank capital adequacy and by the rating 
agency community. These ideal types give prominence to a number of techniques (e.g. value-
at-risk) aimed at quantifying and controlling different risk categories or silos (e.g. market 
risk, credit risk, operational risk), which can be aggregated into a total value of risk within the 
economic capital framework. In this context, the Basel rules and the reform of banking 
supervision have called for a more refined measurement of risks, asking banks to further 
develop their measurement systems and to use their own internal risk models (Wahlström, 
2009).  
In contrast, the ‘risk-based management’ ideal type implies a broader approach to 
risk-based performance measurement and embeds the assumptions of the so called 
‘shareholder value imperative’ (see Mikes, 2009). In fact, starting in the 1990s, the 
deregulation of financial services and growth of the global market (Euske & Riccaboni, 1999; 
Soin & Scheytt, 2008) increased attention to efficiency and profitability within the banking 
sector. Pressures for a shareholder value conception promoted the idea of a joint 
consideration of risk and returns, which characterised value based management systems 
(Arnold & Davies, 2000). Techniques and metrics such as ‘shareholder value-added’ and 
‘risk-adjusted return on capital’ offer examples of how calculative technologies became 
institutionalized (Power, 2005a) and made ‘the relationship between shareholder value and 
risk management newly thinkable and actionable’ (Power, 2007, p. 75).  
Finally, the ‘holistic risk management’ ideal type incorporates strategic decision-
making processes and patterns of accountability towards stakeholders, within a wider ‘risk-
based internal control imperative’ (Mikes, 2009). As stated by Power (2004), risk-based 
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internal control has become ‘an untouchable principle’ (p. 49), enhanced by developments in 
corporate governance. In this context, risk management prescriptions have gradually come to 
involve processes and tools capable of capturing all non-quantifiable risks of relevance for 
the achievement of strategic objectives.  
In this paper we argue that the ideal types described above can be relied upon to 
identify four different ‘risk management templates’ at work within banks. These templates 
represent different structures and systems, which embody different ideas and assumptions 
(e.g. the shareholder value imperative and the risk-based internal control imperative) that 
originate from the external environment and may engage with different roles inside banks.  
2.2 Risk management and roles 
Previous research has acknowledged the growing relevance of risk experts within 
organizations
2
. As claimed by Power (2005b), in response to external pressures and to the call 
for more holistic risk management, risk experts have been pushed to look outside their ‘back-
office cage’ (p. 134) towards a more strategic function. This shift has implied major changes 
and restructuring within companies’ risk management departments, with risk experts being 
asked to play the twin function of ‘compliance champions’ and ‘business partners’ (Mikes, 
2008), also displaying alternative styles of risk management, such as ‘risk measurement’ or 
‘risk envisionment’
3
 (Mikes, 2011). Mikes et al. (2013) highlighted the relevance of risk 
                                                            
2
 Below, we will generally use the label of risk experts to identify the organizational roles with the specific 
functional tasks of measuring, controlling and managing risks inside the organization. Mikes (2009) provides a 
taxonomy of risk experts, distinguishing between: ‘risk management specialists’, who deal with the 
measurement and assessment of different types of risk, as well as with the quantification of the overall risk 
profile of the company; and ‘senior risk officers’, who participate in top management-level decision making, 
supporting and enhancing the management of risk (see also Power, 2005b; Arena et al., 2010). 
3
 Mikes (2011) uses the notion of ‘risk envisionment’ to describe risk management practices based on risk 
experts’ experience and intuition rather than on risk measurement. In this perspective, ‘soft instrumentation’ (i.e. 
decision making methods that favour mental models, experience, beliefs and values) enters the domain of risk 
management. 
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experts’ capacity to design and adopt effective tools in order to gain top level visibility and 
become more influential.  
As argued by Arena et al. (2010), risk experts’ actions could be enhanced or 
constrained depending on the ‘space they are able to find and create within the organization’ 
(p. 14), where they compete with other roles. Indeed, the more strategic function aspired to 
by risk experts has raised a number of critical issues in terms of overlapping tasks and 
responsibilities with other roles, such as management accountants, top managers, and 
directors (Power, 2005b; Collier, Berry, & Burke, 2007; Soin & Scheytt, 2008). Next, we will 
analyse internal (enabling and precipitating) dynamics between different roles in the case of 
Banca Valle. First, we will explain our research methodology. 
3. Research methodology  
The potential of case studies to illustrate and explain accounting in practice has been widely 
acknowledged by the literature (see, for instance, Eisenhardt, 1989; Ryan, Scapens, & 
Theobald, 2002). In particular, there have been recent calls for a deeper understanding of how 
risk and control processes occur and change inside organizations (Berry, Coad, Harris, Otley, 
& Stringer, 2009; Bhimani, 2009; Van der Stede, 2011). Within risk management research, 
there is a particular need for more longitudinal studies to investigate the dynamics of risk 
management and identify the drivers that affect its implementation over time (Mikes, 2009, 
2011; Woods, 2011). Moreover, there is a shortage of case studies on the nature and 
functioning of risk management within banks (Mikes, 2009; Van der Stede, 2011).  
With the aim of exploring risk management change in situ, we rely on a longitudinal 
exploratory case study (Scapens, 2004). This approach provides an opportunity to study 
change from both ‘vertical’ (i.e. considering interdependencies between different levels of 
analysis of phenomena) and ‘horizontal’ (i.e. by exploring sequential interconnectedness 
among phenomena in the past, present and future) perspectives (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 269). It is 
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therefore particularly suited to the purpose of our work as it allows us to explore risk 
management change by looking at the interplay between external pressures and intra-
organizational dynamics of change (vertical perspective) and how this interplay evolves over 
time (horizontal perspective). 
The case material was collected using different sources of data (Yin, 2009). Semi-
structured interviews constituted the primary source of data. Documentary research into 
publically available documents (e.g. annual reports, public risk reports) and internal 
documents (e.g. budgets, internal risk and control reports, presentations at internal meetings) 
was also conducted in order to reconstruct the process of change. The period under 
investigation is 2000-2012. 2000 was chosen as the starting year for the analysis because 
Banca Valle set up a formal risk management unit in that year. The first interview was 
conducted in 2001 with the then Head of the Planning & Control area. Subsequent interviews 
were undertaken during two periods: 2001-2004 and 2009-2012 (see Table 1 in the 
Appendix).  
As argued by Blazejewski (2011, p. 256), in longitudinal studies ‘case time’ and 
‘research time’ may coincide only at certain intervals. If this occurs, the research process 
must also be based on retrospective data produced at a distance from particular events. In our 
case, for the period 2004-2009 (in which we did not observe the process of change as it was 
developing), we used multiple data sources to collect information (Yin, 2009). Most of the 
informants, who were interviewed during the period 2009-2012, were already working for the 
bank in the years 2004-2009 and offered information about this period. Importantly, to 
overcome the limitations of using retrospective data to reconstruct the past (Golden, 1992), 
we triangulated the data collected from the interviews with different informants and verified 
most of the subjective interpretations through documentary and archive data, which 
strengthened the credibility of the analysis (Flick, 2009).  
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Throughout the whole research period, the interviews were conducted at the 
headquarters of the bank. The informants represented different roles (e.g. risk experts, 
management accountants, members of the Organization and Internal Auditing areas, top 
management), and were typically selected for their key positions in the change process 
(Pettigrew, 1990) or for the effects that the change process had on their work. In most cases, 
each informant was interviewed more than once. They were asked very similar questions on 
three main research topics (company background, changes in risk management, role of roles) 
in order to acquire different perspectives on the same issues (Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, 2004), 
which they were encouraged to discuss freely (McKinnon, 1988). Most of the interviews – 
typically lasting two hours – were recorded and transcribed onto electronic files
4
.  
Analysis of the collected data started with the identification of the different phases 
that characterized the evolution of risk management in Banca Valle from early 2000. The aim 
was to build up a chronological picture in order to identify the main elements of risk 
management change in the bank. Our analysis of the interview transcripts and documentary 
research allowed us to distinguish three main periods of time (i.e. 2000-2006; 2006-2009; 
2009-2012) in which different risk management templates and different internal dynamics 
between roles were identifiable.  
During the process of data analysis, we followed a coding approach (O’Dwyer, 2004), 
grouping all the transcript evidence according to the informants, the period of time, and the 
main elements of the theoretical framework described in section 2. Thus, we identified 
precipitating dynamics (interest dissatisfaction and value commitments) and enabling 
dynamics (capacity for action and power dependencies). Evidence concerning external 
pressures and risk management templates (in particular, the risk-based management template 
                                                            
4
 The initial interviews with the former Head of the Planning & Control area were not recorded to ensure that 
the informant would talk freely about the various issues (without being put off by the presence of the recorder) 
and to give him the necessary time to gain confidence with the research methodology. Once we believed that 
this confidence had been gained, we started to record the interviews with the informant’s permission. 
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and the holistic template) was derived from analysis of the changing regulations on risk 
management, as well as from internal documents and from background information provided 
by the informants. Finally, we combined the analysis of internal dynamics, risk management 
templates and external pressures to interpret the role of roles during risk management change 
in Banca Valle. The following section describes the empirical evidence in detail. 
4. The evolution of risk management in Banca Valle  
Next, we analyse and discuss risk management change within Banca Valle by distinguishing 
three main phases (2000-2006; 2006-2009; 2009-2012) within which two particular risk 
management templates and evolving intra-organizational dynamics were identifiable.  
4.1 2000-2006. The risk-based management template  
During the Nineties, the Italian banking sector underwent a significant deregulation process, 
which exposed banks to increasing competition and stimulated processes of privatization, 
acquisition, concentration and growth in the subsequent years (Angelini & Cetorelli, 2003; 
Soin & Scheytt, 2008)
5
. Thus, many Italian banks experienced pressures to re-define their 
strategies, structures and systems in order to ensure more effective performance measurement 
and management (Euske & Riccaboni, 1999). In this context, the need for more effective risk 
measurement acquired prominence, according to the risk-return relationship underlying the 
concept of shareholder value (Power, 2005a). Moreover, the emphasis on risk measurement 
was fostered by the developments in risk quantification and aggregation that followed the 
provision of an international bank regulatory framework by the Basel rules (Mikes, 2009).  
As in other banks, within Banca Valle the external pressures described above 
stimulated changes in the bank’s internal structures and systems, in line with the risk-based 
                                                            
5
 During the 1990s European legislation attempted to liberalize the banking sector, as well as to stimulate 
greater competition. In Italy, a new banking law (Amato Law, 1990) gave all banks the authority to operate in 
any financial sector and initiated a strong process of privatization. Also, a new regulation on banking groups 
stimulated processes of acquisitions, concentration and growth in the sector (Decree Law no. 385, 1993). 
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management template. More specifically, shareholder value creation became a priority for the 
new Board of Banca Valle, which was appointed after the bank was listed on the stock 
exchange and which stressed the importance of a much stronger performance-based 
orientation. This priority was emphasised within an internal document which described 
shareholder value creation as the first in a list of the bank’s ten guiding principles (“managers 
win only when shareholders win was our slogan”, recalled the Chief Financial Officer).  
In this context, Banca Valle decided to design and adopt a new value based 
management (VBM) system in 2001. This decision was aimed at improving performance 
management and capital allocation techniques through a more structured integration of risk 
information within the bank’s planning and budgetary system. As argued by a management 
accountant (MA1) at Banca Valle:  
“setting the rules and the objectives [of business units] according to the risk taken by 
each business unit allows the bank to create value optimizing risk-adjusted 
profitability.”  
Risk-adjusted performance metrics were progressively integrated within both the 
bank’s budgeting system and its strategic planning process. Internal capital allocations via the 
allocation of economic capital were gradually pushed down to the lowest business unit level 
for performance measurement. Also, a new internal reporting system was introduced and 
coordinated by management accountants in the Planning & Control area. The new reporting 
system entailed the production of a monthly ‘Tableau de Bord’, which included profit and 
loss accounts for individual business areas, the main risk-adjusted performance indicators, 
and capital allocations across the bank. The content of this report was discussed during 
monthly ad hoc meetings (called ‘VBM meetings’) between top managers and business unit 
managers, assisted by management accountants. These meetings were an integral part of the 
bank’s strategic planning process, as managers discussed both short term and long term 
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objectives. Moreover, the information provided by the VBM system was presented to the 
Board by the Head of the Planning & Control area (a management accountant) during the 
quarterly meetings for the approval of the budget.  
As we will see in more detail below, management accountants’ control over the VBM 
system and their interactions with the Board were crucial to the move towards the risk-based 
management template within the bank. While regulative and market pressures led to the 
introduction of new structures and systems in Banca Valle, in the form of the VBM system 
and risk-adjusted performance metrics, it was intra-organizational dynamics between roles 
that helped the spread of the ideas and assumptions underpinning the risk-based management 
template inside the bank. 
4.1.1. Risk experts, management accountants and enabling dynamics 
Prior to the 2000s, no formal risk management unit existed within the bank. However, the 
Internal Control unit and the Credit unit were in charge of defining the overall risk policies, 
while risk silo quantification was left to the specific line functions. At that time, the Finance 
area comprised a group of experts on market risk, while credit risk was managed by a specific 
management team within the Credit area.  
Following the pressures of the shareholder value imperative, the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors (CBD) and the General Manager (GM) prompted a thorough 
reorganization of the bank’s risk management activities. To this end they asked the 
management accountants (in the Planning & Control area) to attend a series of ad hoc 
seminars on risk management. These seminars were held by an external consultant with 
strong expertise and a high level of competence in risk management.  
Whereas the initial idea of both the CBD and the GM was to train management 
accountants to fulfil risk management tasks, after the seminars they decided to create an ad 
hoc risk management group, which was distinct from the group of management accountants. 
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To this end, in 2000 qualified risk experts were selected by the bank to be part of a new 
formal Risk Management unit, and the consultant who held the seminars was hired by the 
bank to be in charge of the new unit. The Risk Management unit was placed within the 
Planning & Control area, together with the management accountants, and reported to the 
Head of that area. Within one year, the members of the unit increased to 15 and it was 
formally re-named the ‘Risk Management (RM) service’. Moreover, the Planning & Control 
area was re-named ‘Planning, Control, Administration & RM’ (PCA&RM) to acknowledge 
the key role of the RM service. Until 2006, this area was under the responsibility of one of 
the three Deputy General Managers of the bank reporting to the GM. 
The new RM service became responsible for defining the guidelines and 
methodologies for the measurement and control of all risk factors affecting the bank’s 
economic capital. Thus, the new Head of the RM service, together with the newly selected 
risk experts, offered their expertise in value-at-risk techniques to develop measurements of 
both market and credit risks. Moreover, in 2001 the RM service presided over the kick-off of 
a new project on the quantification of operational risks. As a result of advances in risk 
modelling and quantification, the risk experts began to perceive their importance within the 
bank. This perception was also evident in the way they talked about their role. For example, 
the newly appointed Head of the RM service (HRM1) proudly affirmed:  
“I had to invent an engaging way to attract managers’ attention to risk. We started to 
experiment with new risk [measurement] models, which ended up being recognized as 
the cutting edge.” 
Within the PCA&RM area, risk experts and management accountants had two distinct 
roles. The management accountants were in charge of producing all performance reports and 
measures for VBM and managing all the bank’s planning and budgetary activities. They also 
controlled the VBM information flows towards the top management, by participating in the 
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VBM meetings and providing the Board with the risk-adjusted performance measures 
necessary to discuss the approval of the budget. In contrast, the risk experts performed all 
tasks concerning the production and development of risk quantifications and economic 
capital measures to be reported to the management accountants in order for them to calculate 
risk-adjusted performance measures within the VBM system. These measures could then be 
used by top managers (supported by the management accountants) to negotiate objectives for 
the business units and plan capital allocations. As a result, the transfer of risk quantifications 
from the risk experts to the management accountants was the main contact between the two 
groups, which managed their tasks separately. Management accountants did not therefore feel 
threatened by the role of risk experts. As stated by a management accountant (MA2):     
“the inclusion of risk experts within the Planning & Control area was not so dramatic 
[…] we had different tasks really, like two parallel worlds”.  
In addition to the risk quantifications for VBM, the risk experts were also required to 
report on a monthly basis to a risk committee, which was in charge of defining adequate risk 
management policies for all the bank’s business units, evaluating its overall risk profile, as 
well as verifying respect for the risk limits (see Figure 1).  
----------- Insert Figure 1 about here ------------ 
The risk committee was chaired by the GM and the Head of the RM service, and was 
composed of the Heads of Banca Valle’s main business units. The reports produced by the 
risk experts for the risk committee were very technical. Within these reports, complete risk 
exposure lists and their impact on the economic capital were analysed in detail. The activity 
of the risk committee was central to risk management at the business unit level, since it dealt 
with all matters concerning quantifiable risk issues. Nonetheless, risk information was 
communicated monthly by the risk committee to the CBD (and every three months to the 
Board) only in the form of the short minutes of the risk committee meetings. The minutes 
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were kept in the Board secretary’s office, where the directors could find and read the 
documents without any direct interaction with, or direct explanation from, the risk committee. 
Moreover, the minutes usually contained only a brief (2-3 page) description of the key points 
discussed by the Head of the RM service and the business unit managers during the meetings.  
In contrast, risk quantifications became important for the directors primarily when 
they were related to profitability and shareholder value creation within the VBM system. It 
was through the integration of risk information with the formal planning and performance 
measurement system that risk issues gained regular attention from the top managers and the 
Board. In this context, although the risk experts had highly specialized tasks in producing risk 
quantifications and definitions of capital allocations, it was the management accountants who 
had control over the relevant VBM information flows (“during the VBM meetings we were 
sitting side by side with senior managers, with the VBM metrics in front of us” – argued a 
management accountant, MA1). Such control gave the management accountants the capacity 
to mobilize their skills to report and explain all risk-adjusted performance information 
concerning VBM to the top management and directors. As argued by the former Head of the 
PCA&RM area (HPCRM): 
“it was easier for us to explain, and for the directors to understand, risk-adjusted 
performance metrics rather than complex risk quantifications.”  
Overall, the diffusion of the underlying ideas and assumptions of the risk-based 
management template (Figure 3, arrow d) was stimulated by two enabling dynamics (Figure 
3, arrow a). First, the management accountants showed the capacity for action necessary to 
allow risk information and knowledge to reach the Board and top managers for strategic 
planning through the VBM system (Figure 3, arrow b). Second, the risk information reached 
the Board and top managers thanks to the power dependencies of the risk experts in relation 
to the management accountants (Figure 3, arrow c). Outside the VBM and risk-return metrics, 
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where the mediation of management accountants was not present (as in the case of the 
information provided by the risk committee), risk information did not actually enter the 
Board’s strategic discussions.  
However, as we will see in the following phase, evolving external pressures prepared 
the ground for change by stimulating growing dissatisfaction among risk experts. 
4.2 2006-2009. Precipitating dynamics and the emergence of the holistic template 
In the early years of the 2000s, following financial scandals worldwide and episodes of 
corporate failures in various sectors, the pressures of corporate governance and risk 
regulations became more compelling (Power, 2004; Soin & Scheytt, 2008). In Italy, as in 
other countries, new norms were adopted by national governments with the aim of re-
regulating internal patterns of accountability within companies (see among others Fiori & 
Tiscini, 2005)
6
. This fostered the rise of what has been referred to as the ‘risk-based internal 
control imperative’ (Mikes, 2009). 
Accordingly, a number of international standards and guidelines stimulated companies 
to develop their risk management practices following a more holistic approach (Woods, 
2011). In this context, the term holistic was used to refer to a process-based view of risk 
management that should permeate organizations’ strategy and enable them to consider the 
potential impact of all types of risks on the achievement of their objectives (COSO, 2004). 
This definition also encompasses non-quantifiable risks, which are not strictly related to 
financial risk management or to risk-adjusted profitability. All significant risks that could 
affect organizations’ strategic objectives should enter corporate-level discussions and be 
systematically managed (ISO, 2009). According to the holistic template, in addition to 
                                                            
6
 Following the self-regulatory code for Italian listed companies of 1999, in the early years of the millennium 
new versions of this code have increasingly incorporated risk management guidelines and prescriptions within 
internal control systems according to international best practices (see the revised edition of the Corporate 
Governance Code, December 2011). Moreover, other regulations were promulgated in Italy during the same 
period with the aim of preserving the banking sector (see for instance, Law no. 262, 2005). 
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producing traditional risk metrics, the risk expert should also be ‘the author of a wider 
organizational narrative of risk which sits above formal control systems’ (Power, 2004, p. 
51).  
Whereas the risk-based management template was still dominant within Banca Valle 
in 2006, the rise of the risk-based internal control imperative brought with it pressures for 
change, in conjunction with internal precipitating dynamics (Figure 3, arrow e). These 
pressures started in 2006 when the bank hired a new Head of the RM service. Within a short 
time, the RM service was separated from the PCA&RM area (which was simply re-named 
the ‘Planning & Control’ area) in order to ensure the risk experts’ independence from the line 
management as prescribed by external recommendations. However, within the bank’s new 
organizational structure both the RM service and the Planning & Control area were still under 
the responsibility of the recently appointed Chief Financial Officer (CFO), who reported to 
the GM. The new Head of the RM service (HRM2) was formerly a consultant and perfectly 
aware of the emerging risk-based internal control imperative. As he recalled:  
“risk managers need to take part in the discussion of corporate strategies [...] that 
should be my task [...] going in front of directors and telling them ‘if these are your 
objectives, you should do this to achieve them’ or ‘it is extremely dangerous to 
achieve your objectives, if you act this way’.”  
The new Head of the RM service was extremely confident about the strategic role of 
risk experts. He felt that their role could move beyond the production of risk-adjusted 
performance measures and expand outside the domain of risk measurement. Within a few 
months his vision was embraced by the members of the RM service and interest 
dissatisfaction started to arise among the risk experts (Figure 3, arrow f). As highlighted by a 
risk expert (RE1) belonging to the RM service’s credit risk team: 
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“we felt that our tasks were constrained and limited. I am not sure that the directors 
really read the risk committee’s reports”. 
These perceptions, shared by other risk experts, also led to the emergence of a pattern 
of competitive value commitment (Figure 3, arrow g). In fact, while the management 
accountants supported the template-in-use (i.e. the risk-based management template), as they 
had a key role in the provision of risk-return information within the VBM system and in 
relation to the wider shareholder value imperative, the risk experts recognized that the new 
alternative template (i.e. the holistic risk management template) could enhance their strategic 
role and allow them to gain a more influential position vis-à-vis the Board’s decision-making 
process.  
In this context, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 also had a broad influence on the 
bank’s internal dynamics. As in other financial institutions, the crisis demanded more 
accurate cost management within Banca Valle. In the first months of 2009, the bank had to 
revise business units’ budgets, significantly reducing their economic targets. Whereas the 
crisis has been often associated with poor risk management, and particularly with excessive 
trust in risk modelling (Rebonato, 2007), Banca Valle’s risk experts did not criticize risk 
models and quantifications. Instead, they questioned the Board’s capacity to interpret these 
models and anticipate the worst-case scenarios during strategic decision-making, from which 
the risk experts had actually been excluded. As claimed by one such expert (RE2):  
“the crisis had effects we had never seen before and we had to work hard...  We [risk 
experts] measured and provided correct risk information as we were supposed to, but 
risk changes continuously. Quantitative models are necessary but they are only 
simplistic descriptions of reality, which need to be interpreted. I am not sure they [the 
directors] actually did it”. 
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Consistently with the findings of Mikes (2011) from one of her field studies, within 
Banca Valle the risk experts defended themselves against the apparent failure of risk 
management by contending their absence from the discussion of non-measurable strategic 
issues. In the meantime, pressures from the crisis helped strengthen the risk experts’ 
awareness of their potentially strategic role within the bank, thus increasing their level of 
interest dissatisfaction in relation to the current situation and their desire for change towards a 
different template. This dissatisfaction and desire were further encouraged by external 
prescriptions from regulators and professional bodies following the financial crisis. These 
prescriptions recommended that risk experts should provide the top management and Board 
with more forward-looking information regarding a wide range of risk issues (Kirkpatrick, 
2009; Deloitte, 2011), and that the Board should properly oversee the risk management 
process (RIMS, 2009). 
Overall, in the period 2006-2009 the external pressures towards a risk-based internal 
control imperative enhanced the emergence of the precipitating dynamics (interest 
dissatisfaction and competitive value commitment) described above, which generated strong 
pressures for change (Figure 3, arrow h). As we will see next, these pressures pushed risk 
experts out of the back-office cage (Power, 2005b) and beyond the domain of mere risk 
measurement (Mikes, 2009; 2011) through the development of internal enabling dynamics 
(Figure 3, arrow i). 
4.3 2009-2012. The holistic risk management template within Banca Valle: internal 
(enabling) dynamics 
Within Banca Valle, the pressures for change described in the above sub-section enhanced 
the need for direct interaction between the Board and risk experts. This need was also 
reinforced by international recommendations on risk management (IIF, 2008; CEBS, 2010; 
OECD, 2010), as well as national recommendations on the independence of the risk 
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management function and its direct accountability to the Board
7
. Following these pressures, a 
new independent RM area was created at the beginning of 2009. The new RM area was still 
headed by the same manager appointed in 2006, who reported directly to the GM and the 
Board within the new organizational structure. The creation of the new RM area, together 
with external pressures, reinforced direct relations between the risk experts and the Board and 
stimulated two enabling dynamics. Firstly, risk experts acquired the capacity for action 
necessary to change the template-in-use into the bank and, secondly, the patterns of power 
dependencies between roles changed. Let us see how. 
In Banca Valle, the Head of the RM area began to work closely with a member of the 
CBD’s staff to find a way of ensuring the RM area’s visibility vis-à-vis the Board. They 
decided together to design and submit to the Board a new risk report (labelled the ‘monthly 
risk report’). Although the need for this report mainly derived from the new patterns of 
reporting between the RM area and the Board, the introduction of the monthly risk report was 
perceived by the Head of the RM area as a way of helping risk experts acquire a more 
significant role in high-level strategic decision-making processes.  
“We had to find a way to enhance communication with the directors, by offering them 
the most desirable dish we had on our menu!” (Head of the RM area, HRM2). 
“The basic idea was to think about the Board’s key strategic risk concerns. What 
would they [the directors] like to read in the monthly risk report to support them in 
planning the right strategy?” (member of the CBD’s staff, SCBD).   
                                                            
7
 See the Circular No. 263, 2006 issued by the Bank of Italy and the Regulation jointly issued by the Bank of 
Italy and Consob in 2007 and their updates.   
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In contrast to the short minutes of the risk committee, the new monthly report had a 
more comprehensive structure, with standardized sections. The initial sections contained 
traditional information on the bank’s risk exposure. The following sections contained the 
analysis of all the different risk silos. Then, in an ad hoc section, the economic capital was 
quantified and calculations were explained. In addition to the risk quantifications, qualitative 
information, explanations and appealing charts were included, with the aim of providing the 
directors with concise and comprehensible information on the bank’s overall risk profile and 
trend. Moreover, the monthly risk report did not contain many metrics. Very specific 
technical language was avoided, a glossary of the main terms was provided at the end of the 
report, and the risk information could be easily interpreted by the directors. In this way, 
consistently with the findings of Mikes et al. (2013), the risk experts were able to establish a 
new communication process with the directors. As claimed by a risk expert (RE3) belonging 
to the RM area’s risk reporting team: 
“the information we provide is simpler than the information provided by the risk 
committee, but in any case it is in-depth enough to allow the Board to understand the 
different dimensions of risk […] the report is a tool to grab their attention and 
support them during their strategic discussions”. 
Since 2009, the risk report has been presented directly to the Board by the Head of the 
RM area every three months, and monthly to a committee composed of the CBD, the GM and 
the Chairman of the Internal Auditing Committee (CIAC). The presentation of the monthly 
risk report takes place during ad hoc meetings which offer important opportunities for 
discussion and interaction between the Head of the RM area and the Board (see Figure 2).  
-------------------------- Insert Figure 2 about here -------------------------- 
During these meetings the Head of the RM area provides direct face-to-face 
explanations concerning the monthly risk report to the Board. Thus, the new reporting 
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process started to change the ways in which risk information and knowledge entered the 
Board’s discussions, and gave prominence to the role and skills of the Head of the RM area 
As the latter (HRM2) recalled:  
“the Board’s attitude has completely changed. […] They [the directors] ask a lot of 
questions and, increasingly often, ask us to elaborate on specific risk issues for ad hoc 
decision-making purposes”. 
The monthly risk report therefore became a flexible tool in which new ad hoc sections 
were added upon the request of the Board, or according to key areas identified by the risk 
experts. 
“Very often during our meetings [with the CBD, the GM and the CIAC] I have been 
asked to hold presentations on special risk topics, such as an analysis of the liquidity 
risk or the potential scenarios for the bank after an interest rate hike. Last month I 
had to report directly to the Board on the impact of a political crisis in an Asian 
country on our financial portfolio” (Head of the RM area, HRM2).      
The Board and the top management showed great interest in these discussions, giving 
risk experts a new visibility in strategic decision-making. Specifically, the new reporting 
system provided risk experts with the capacity for action necessary to claim direct access to 
strategic discussions and create their own new space within the bank (Figure 3, arrow l). This 
space expanded beyond the mere risk measurement function for risk-adjusted performance 
and capital allocations and involved a different approach to risk management (i.e. a sort of 
‘risk envisionment’ in Mikes’ terms – see Mikes, 2011), based on the risk experts’ experience 
and intuitions. Thus, the risk experts participated in the move towards the holistic risk 
management template. As stated by the Head of the RM area (HRM2), 
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“our discussions [with the directors] start from market and economic trends and end 
by developing hypotheses on the potential impacts of these dynamics. The ‘numbers’ 
are no longer at the top of the list for them”.   
Furthermore, the need to produce the monthly risk report changed the patterns of 
power dependencies between the new RM area and the management accountants (Figure 3, 
arrow m). In particular, the risk experts became autonomous in relation to the mediation of 
management accountants, interacting with the Board for strategic decision-making beyond 
the VBM system (“now I can directly reach ‘the top level’ whenever necessary”, argued the 
Head of the RM area, HRM2). Despite the changes in the patterns of power dependencies 
between roles, the management accountants did not show a competitive attitude towards the 
new role of risk experts and the holistic template. As stated by the Head of the P&C area 
(HPC), 
“our tasks are completely different, but both are crucial to strategy analysis. There is 
a sort of balance of powers in which we plan how to achieve business strategies and 
they contribute to limiting excessive risk-taking.”  
Overall, the new patterns of power dependencies and the risk experts’ capacity for 
action (enabling dynamics) allowed a broader view of risk (i.e. a view that went beyond mere 
risk quantifications) to permeate decision-making processes (Figure 3, arrow n). Thus, 
enabling dynamics favoured a ‘radical’ change (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996) from risk-
based management towards a new holistic risk management template within Banca Valle.  
4.4 Risk management change in Banca Valle 
As shown in the previous sub-sections, the process of change in risk management within 
Banca Valle has resulted from an ongoing interplay between external pressures and intra-
organizational dynamics. While external pressures stimulated changes in the template-in-use, 
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enabling and precipitating dynamics between roles influenced the ways in which these 
templates were interpreted and developed throughout the organization. 
In this respect, numerous studies (Power, 2009; Magnan & Markarian, 2011) have 
emphasised a widespread failure of risk management prescriptions to provide organizations 
with effective tools to anticipate and manage the difficulties and uncertainties encountered 
during the global financial crisis of the years 2007-2009. Despite their apparent failure and 
shortcomings, risk management prescriptions from regulators and professional bodies have 
proliferated hugely, in a seemingly counterintuitive search for ‘more of the same’ (Huber & 
Scheytt, 2013, p. 89). As demonstrated by recent literature (Mikes, 2009; 2011; Arena et al., 
2010; Woods, 2011), organizations responded to growing prescriptions in a variety of ways 
and, through their responses, the ‘ideal of risk management has survived’ beyond its apparent 
failures (Mikes, 2011, p. 226).  
The case of Banca Valle shows that the apparent contradiction between the 
widespread failure of risk management prescriptions (especially in relation to the global 
financial crisis) and the ongoing search for ‘more of the same’ can be explained at the micro 
level of the organization by considering the internal dynamics that aided the change of the 
risk management templates. Within Banca Valle, the evolving nature of enabling and 
precipitating dynamics between roles allowed a changing awareness of risk management to 
develop, shifting from an awareness of risk-return metrics to a broader conception of strategic 
risk beyond numbers. This change extended through different risk management structures and 
systems, regardless of the apparent failures of external prescriptions. Thus, the search for 
more risk management in Banca Valle persisted at the organization level. 
More specifically, in the years 2000-2006 risk-return information entered strategic 
decision-making at the Board level in Banca Valle through a quantitative language of risk-
adjusted performance metrics. This language developed among risk experts, management 
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accountants, and top management through the VBM reports and the Tableau de Bord. 
Information and knowledge about risk-adjusted performance reached the Board mainly 
through the capacity for action of the management accountants. This capacity also reinforced 
the power dependencies of risk experts, who were aware of their dependence upon 
management accountants (as their mediation was necessary for risk information and 
knowledge to reach the Board). Through these internal enabling dynamics, a risk-return 
awareness (based on the basic assumptions of the risk-based management template within the 
shareholder value imperative) entered strategic decision-making within Banca Valle. This 
awareness was strictly dependent upon advances in risk-return quantification within the VBM 
system. In this context, risk measurement was perceived by the risk experts as the prevailing 
‘risk management style’ (Mikes, 2011) capable of providing them with a role (albeit mediated 
by management accountants) within strategic decision-making processes [‘I had to invent an 
engaging way to attract managers’ attention to risk. We started to experiment with new risk 
models...’ – Head of the RM service quoted above].  
After the risk-based management template entered the organization, precipitating 
dynamics were stimulated in the second phase (2006-2009) by external pressures towards the 
holistic template. Within these dynamics, the risk experts started to perceive their role as 
constrained, and a pattern of competitive value commitment arose between them and the 
management accountants. In this context, the risk experts pursued an alternative template (the 
holistic template) as a way of realizing their interests and aspirations. However, while Mikes 
(2011) in her field study highlighted that a culture of quantitative enthusiasm was helpful for 
risk experts to ‘displace blame and protect their autonomy’ (p. 241), in the case of Banca 
Valle external pressures after the crisis helped increase risk experts’ demand for a greater 
involvement in the strategic arena beyond mere risk quantifications.       
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Nevertheless, it was only with the new risk reporting system that the patterns of risk 
experts’ power dependencies in relation to management accountants changed. Also, 
following external pressures for change and the adoption of a new organizational structure for 
the RM area, the risk experts acquired the capacity for action necessary to move towards the 
new holistic template within the bank. Through these new internal dynamics (and despite the 
apparent failure of risk management prescriptions within the broader institutional context), 
the prevailing assumptions of the holistic template spread inside the bank, allowing for a 
more holistic risk awareness (beyond the mere quantification of risk) to enter strategic 
discussions at the Board level [‘that should be my task […] going in front of directors and 
telling them “if these are your objectives, you should do this to achieve them” …’ – Head of 
the RM service, quoted above]. 
The move towards the holistic template within the bank was also facilitated by the 
way in which the risk experts mobilized their skills and constructed the new monthly risk 
report, combining risk quantification with broader qualitative information and face-to-face 
explanations and communications with the Board. The experience and intuition of the risk 
experts, and particularly of the Head of the RM area, were thus crucial to the shift from a risk 
measurement approach to what Mikes (2011) defined as a ‘risk envisionment’ style.    
Overall, the case of Banca Valle shows that external risk management prescriptions 
did have an impact within the bank through internal dynamics between roles, which allowed 
an evolving awareness and a broader (holistic) conception of risk to enter decision-making 
processes at the Board level. In so doing, the aspiration towards a sort of risk management 
ideal persisted over time and over evolving templates within the bank.  
------------------ Insert here Figure 3 ------------------- 
5. Conclusions  
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This paper sheds light on the role of roles during processes of risk management change. In 
particular, it suggests that changes in risk management within organizations, and especially 
the role of roles within these processes, can be explored through the lens of an institutional 
perspective. 
Although recent studies have investigated risk management practices in specific 
organizational settings (see among others Mikes, 2009; 2011), to the best of our knowledge 
they have not probed the dynamics of risk management change over an extended period of 
time. Relying upon the longitudinal study of Banca Valle (in the years 2000-2012), this paper 
represents one of the few studies to explore the ongoing interplay between external pressures 
and intra-organizational dynamics during processes of risk management change within a 
bank.  
In this respect, our research provides various contributions. Firstly, it shows that 
changes in risk management within organizations do not occur swiftly and only as a result of 
external recommendations or prescriptions. Instead, the way in which risk management 
evolves over time is influenced by both external pressures and intra-organizational dynamics, 
which gradually affect the patterns of interaction between roles at the micro level of the 
organization. To investigate risk management change, we relied upon the theoretical insights 
offered by Greenwood and Hinings (1993; 1996). Whereas Greenwood and Hinings’ (1993; 
1996) framework has been used recently in accounting literature to explain different patterns 
of accounting change within organizations (Liguori & Steccolini, 2012), to the best of our 
knowledge it has never been adopted to specifically explore risk management change. By 
drawing upon Greenwood and Hinings’ (1996) definitions of institutional templates and 
intra-organizational dynamics, we showed that within Banca Valle external pressures towards 
different risk management templates were filtered through different and evolving intra-
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organizational dynamics (i.e. interest dissatisfaction, competitive value commitment, power 
dependencies, capacity for action) over different periods of time.  
Secondly, in exploring risk management change, the case of Banca Valle provides 
evidence on the role of roles in influencing the way in which risk management templates are 
interpreted and develop inside banks. In particular, we focused on the role of risk experts and 
management accountants and on their interactions with top executives (e.g., in our case, top 
management and directors). In this context, our paper shows how certain roles are able to 
actively contribute to the diffusion of ideas and assumptions about risk management that 
originated in the external environment throughout the organization. In our case, in the first 
phase (2000-2006) the assumptions of the risk-based management template spread inside the 
bank through the risk experts’ power dependencies in relation to the management 
accountants, as well as through the management accountants’ capacity for action. In the 
second phase (2006-2009) both the competitive value commitment between the risk experts 
and management accountants and risk experts’ growing interest dissatisfaction prepared the 
ground for change towards the holistic template. This change occurred in the third phase 
(2009-2012), through new patterns of power dependencies and the risk experts’ capacity for 
action. Thus, our study adds to the recent literature on the role of risk experts (e.g. Mikes, 
2011; Mikes et al., 2013), suggesting that their actual function inside organizations depends 
on their specific interests, the different templates they support, and the shifts in power for 
control over key information.  
Thirdly, our research highlights the relevance of reporting systems in influencing 
dynamics between roles within the process of risk management change. Importantly, we 
showed that the roles that control the main information flows within the reporting systems 
influence the prevailing assumptions about risk management within the organization. In our 
case, changes towards the risk-based management and the holistic templates were supported 
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respectively by the management accountants when they controlled the system of VBM 
reporting to the top managers, and the risk experts when they controlled the new risk 
reporting system (based on the monthly risk report) for the Board. In our case the 
mobilization of risk experts’ technical and managerial capabilities to construct the new 
monthly risk report allowed them to claim more space within strategic decision-making, thus 
enabling the process of risk management change. As a result, we corroborate recent claims 
(see Mikes et al., 2013) about the importance of the tools used by risk experts in allowing 
them to gain influence at the top organizational levels. 
Finally, we shed light on the apparent contradiction between the supposed failure of 
risk management in practice and the ongoing and expanding quest for (and interest in) a ‘risk 
management ideal’ (Mikes, 2011) and risk management prescriptions (Huber & Scheytt, 
2013). In particular, we show that this contradiction may be explained at a micro 
(organizational) level by looking at the intra-organizational dynamics that help introduce and 
develop the assumptions underlying risk management templates inside organizations. Within 
Banca Valle, the evolving nature of the enabling and precipitating dynamics between roles 
allowed a changing awareness of risk management (from a risk-return awareness to a broader 
strategic concept of risk beyond numbers) to develop in relation to risk management 
structures and systems, reflecting different templates and moving beyond the apparent 
failures of external prescriptions. Whereas risk awareness per se is not enough to ensure the 
actual use of risk information within strategic decision-making processes, in our case it 
sustained the search for more risk management, stimulating its ongoing evolution inside the 
bank. Thus, we extend Mikes (2011) by providing evidence of how the shift from a risk 
measurement approach to what she referred to as a ‘risk envisionment’ approach can be 
dependent upon the interplay between external pressures and intra-organizational dynamics, 
within a process of change that occurs over an extended period of time.    
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In offering these contributions, this paper is not without its limitations. Being a 
longitudinal case study referring to an extended period of time, the informants’ 
interpretations of risk management change (which in some cases provided retrospective 
information on the role of roles) may have been affected by their overall knowledge of the 
entire story of risk management change within the bank, as well as by their own subjective 
perceptions. Moreover, as some of the informants offered information about their own role, 
they may have attempted to make their role appear more strategic than it actually was. 
Although our data triangulation with internal documents (and between different informants) 
attempted to limit these kinds of bias, some distortions may still remain. Nonetheless, 
understanding individuals’ subjective perceptions was important to us in clarifying the 
internal dynamics between roles. Moreover, we focused our analysis on the roles whose 
participation in the process of risk management change was more evident (e.g. risk experts, 
management accountants, top managers, directors), but we acknowledge that other roles 
(such as business lines and operational staff) could be affected by processes of change.  
As our findings are limited to a single case, further longitudinal studies are necessary 
to explore processes of risk management change. In particular, more research is needed to 
understand the degree (and actual significance and implications) of success and failure of risk 
management structures and systems within different organizational settings, as well as the 
influence of individuals’ perceptions about who they are in relation to processes of change. 
Future studies could also explore the more subtle (and invisible) consequences of risk 
management change. Indeed, researching risk management at the micro-level of 
organizations is important to understand the actual functioning and practice of risk 
management in the context in which it develops. 
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Table 1 – Interviews schedule  
Role of the informant Code 
Years in 
charge for 
the role 
N. of interviews 
from 2001 to 2004 
N. of interviews 
from 2009 to 2012 
Chief Financial Officer CFO 2010-2012  1 
Head of the RM service (1) HRM1 2000-2006  1 
Head of the RM service (2) 
(RM area from 2009) 
HRM2 2006-2011  3 
Risk expert in the RM service (1) 
(RM area from 2009) 
RE1 2002-2008 1 1 
Risk expert in the RM service (2) 
(RM area from 2009) 
RE2 2006-2012  1 
Risk expert in the RM service (3) 
(RM area from 2009) 
RE3 2009-2012  1 
Head of the PCA&RM area 
(P&C area from 2006) 
HPCRM 2001-2009 5 3 
Management accountant in the 
PCA&RM area (1) 
(P&C area from 2006) 
MA1 2002-2010 1 1 
Management accountant in the 
PCA&RM area (2) 
(P&C area from 2006) 
MA2 2005-2009  1 
Head of the P&C area HPC 2010-2012  3 
Head of the Organization area HO 2010-2012  2 
Member of the Organization area (1) O1 2002-2010 1  
Member of the Organization area (2) O2 2001-2006 1  
Member of the CBD’s staff  SCBD 2008-2011  2 
Head of the Internal Auditing area HIA 2005-2010  1 
Member of the Internal Auditing area IA 2001-2006 1  
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Figure 1 – Information flows between the PCA&RM area and the top management of the bank 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Information flows between the RM area and the top management of the bank 
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Figure 3 – RM change within Banca Valle 
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
1. Interview strategy 
The main purpose of the interviews was to collect information on risk management change within 
the selected bank, as well as on the changes in the internal dynamics between roles. In particular, 
interviews were conducted with those organizational roles that were more involved in the process of 
risk management change. 
Hence, interviews were firstly conducted with the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), the former and 
the current Heads of the Planning & Control area, the former and the current Heads of the Risk 
Management area, members of the Chairman’s staff, of the Risk Management area and of the 
Planning & Control area. The aim was to collect data on the main changes occurred in risk 
management practices and the related changes in organizational roles and their interactions.  
Secondly, interviews were conducted also with the Head and members of the Organization area and 
of the Internal auditing area in order to understand the changes in the organizational structure, as 
well as the pressures for change coming from external regulations. 
Our meetings with the key informants were based on semi-structured interviews. In particular, we 
adopted an interview guide to ask the main questions to the informants. These questions concerned 
the main research themes: background to the company, changes in risk management, role of roles. 
To avoid possible bias, we let informants talk freely about the main points that were asked, allowing 
new issues to come out from the interviews, and thus new questions were eventually asked as a 
result of what the informants were saying. 
Typically, the same basic set of questions was made to those respondents sharing similar 
organizational roles. Hence, we adopted four different interview guide samples (reported below) to 
frame questions for: risk experts, management accountants, top managers, and other roles. 
Additionally, some informants were interviewed more than once during the research period in order 
to verify the preliminary findings and keep track of any major change occurred in the meantime. 
Most of the interviews were recorded and transcribed into electronic files. The initial interviews 
with the ex-Head of the P&C area were not recorded to ensure that the informant would talk freely 
about the various issues (without being put off by the presence of the recorder) and to give him the 
necessary time to gain confidence in the research methodology. Once we believed that this 
confidence was achieved, we started to record the interviews with the informant’s permission. 
 
2. Interview guide samples 
 
Following, three samples of interview guides will be presented referring, respectively, to the group 
of risk experts (as we labeled the members of the Risk Management area), the group of 
management accountants (as we labeled the members of the Planning & Control area), the top 
management (e.g. CFO, members of the Chairman’s staff), and other roles.  
 
Interview guide sample for the group of risk experts 
 
A. Background information of the interviewee (e.g. name, position, main tasks and responsibilities, 
career pattern in the bank, etc.) and of the bank (e.g. history, mission, major events in the last years, 
etc.) 
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 B. General questions relating to changes in risk management practices over the years: 
(1) Can you describe the main features of the current risk management practices in the bank?   
How do you characterize these practices?  
(2) Are you satisfied with how the top management of the bank deals with risk management? 
(3) Which are the main changes in risk management the bank faced in the last years? 
(4) Why do you think such changes happened?  
(5) From where did the main pressures for change come? 
(6) What do you think about this process of change? Which elements did it mainly involve? 
 
C. General questions relating to changing organizational roles: 
(1) How do you consider the role of risk managers? Has it changed in the last years? Why?  
(2) What do you believe are the major changes in this role in the bank? 
(3) Which are the main interactions between the Risk Management area and top 
management/Board of Directors? How did they change? 
(4) Which are the main interactions between the Risk Management area and the Planning & 
Control area? How did they change? 
(5) Which are the main processes and tools for the exchange of the information flows between 
the Risk Management area and top management/Board of Directors? How did they change? 
(6) Which are the main processes and tools for the exchange of the information flows between 
the Risk Management area and the Planning & Control area? How did they change? 
 
Interview guide sample for the group of management accountants 
 
A. Background information of the interviewee (e.g. name, position, main tasks and responsibilities, 
career pattern in the bank, etc.) and of the bank (e.g. history, mission, major events in the last years, 
etc.) 
 
B. General questions relating to changes in risk management and management accounting practices 
over the years: 
(1) Can you describe the main features of the current management accounting practices in the 
bank? How do you characterize these practices? 
(2) How is the planning and control activity developed?  
(3) How are risk management and management accounting practices related to each other in 
terms of processes and tools?  
(4) Are you satisfied with how the top management of the bank deals with the planning and 
control activities? 
(5) Which are the main changes in management accounting practices the bank faced in the last 
years? Why do you think such changes happened? 
(6) What do you believe are the main relations between these changes and the evolution of risk 
management? 
 
C. General questions relating to changing organizational roles: 
(1) How do you consider the role of management accountants? Has it changed in the last years? 
Why? 
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(2) How do you consider the role of risk managers? Has it changed in the last years? Why? 
(3) What do you believe are the major changes in these two roles in the bank? 
(4) Which are the main interactions between the Planning & Control area and top 
management/Board of Directors? How did they change? 
(5) Which are the main interactions between the Planning & Control area and the Risk 
Management area? How did they change? 
(6) Which are the main processes and tools for the exchange of the information flows between 
the Planning & Control area and top management/Board of Directors? How did they 
change? 
(7) Which are the main processes and tools for the exchange of the information flows between 
the Planning & Control area Risk Management area? How did they change? 
 
 Interview guide sample for the top management 
 
A. Background information of the interviewee (e.g. name, position, main tasks and responsibilities, 
career pattern in the bank, etc.) and of the bank (e.g. history, mission, major events in the last years, 
etc.) 
 
B. General questions relating to changes occurred in the bank over the years: 
(1) Can you describe the main changes occurred in the bank over the years? What did they 
entail in terms of organizational strategies?  
(2) What do you believe are the main effects of new regulations and external pressures on the 
activity of the bank? 
(3) How do you think the attitude of the Board towards risk management changed in the last 
years?  
(4) How is risk information considered during strategic decision-making processes?   
 
C. General questions relating to changing organizational roles: 
(1) How do you consider the role of risk managers? Has it changed in the last years? Why? 
(2) What do you believe are the major changes in the role of risk managers in the bank? 
(3) Which are the main interactions between the top management and the Planning & Control 
area? How did they change? 
(4) Which are the main interactions between the top management and the Risk Management 
area? How did they change? 
(5) Which are the main processes and tools for the exchange of the information flows between 
the Planning & Control area and top management? How did they change? 
(6) Which are the main processes and tools for the exchange of the information flows between 
the Risk Management area and the top management? How did they change? 
 
Interview guide sample for other roles 
 
A. Background information of the interviewee (e.g. name, position, main tasks and responsibilities, 
career pattern in the bank, etc.) and of the bank (e.g. history, mission, major events in the last years, 
etc.) 
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B. General questions relating to changes occurred in the bank and in risk management practices: 
(1) Can you describe the main changes occurred in the bank over the years? What did they 
entail in terms of organizational strategies? 
(2)  Which are the main changes in risk management the bank faced in the last years? 
(3) What do you believe are the main effects of new regulations and external pressures on the 
activity of the bank? 
(4) What do you believe are the main effects of new regulations and external pressures on risk 
management practices within the bank?   
 
C. General questions relating to changing organizational roles: 
(1) How do you consider the role of risk managers? Has it changed in the last years? Why? 
(2) What do you believe are the major changes in the role of risk managers in the bank? 
(3) Which are the main changes in the relation between the Risk Management area and your 
organizational function?  
(4) Do you think that changes in risk management practices have affected the activity of your 
function? In which ways? 
 
3. Data coding procedures 
 
Most of the interviews – typically lasting two hours – were recorded and transcribed into electronic 
files (Word documents). When recording was not possible (e.g. in case of some off-recording 
comments), notes were immediately taken and then reported at the bottom of the related 
transcription.  
After the transcriptions, each interview was read in-depth and this (combined with the documentary 
research) allowed us to identify three main phases of time (i.e. 2000-2006; 2006-2009; 2009-2012) 
into which changes in risk management practices were observable inside the bank.  
During this process of analysis, we coded all the transcript evidence according to the informants, 
the phase of time, and the elements of our theoretical framework (precipitating dynamics - interests 
dissatisfaction and value commitments; enabling dynamics - power dependencies and capacity for 
action). 
Following, we report the main criteria for data coding. 
 
Informants Code 
Head of the RM service (1) HRM1 
Risk expert in the RM service (1) RE1 
Head of the PCA&RM area HPCRM 
Management accountant in the PCA&RM area (1) MA1 
Member of the CBD’s staff SCBD 
Etc. .... 
 
Dynamics 
precipitating 
interests 
dissatisfaction 
PID 
value commitments PVC 
enabling 
power dependencies EPD 
capacity for action ECFA 
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Below, we report an extract from the table we built in a Microsoft Excel file to analyze the main 
evidence according to our theoretical framework and identify specific patterns emerging from the 
interviews.  
Numbers in boxes refer to the specific Word file of the transcription, and the specific pages, in 
which evidence of the various elements of the framework (for each phase) was found. In so doing, 
we could identify all transcript evidence concerning each dynamic, for each period and key 
informant, to support the case analysis and the discussion of each element of the framework. 
 
     
 2000-2006 2006-2009 2009-2012 
Informant 
code 
PID PVC EPD ECFA PID PVC EPD ECFA PID PVC EPD ECFA 
HRM1   
F.1, 
p. 3 
 
 
F.2, 
p. 4 
F.1, p. 
5,10 
    F.3, p. 7  
RE1      
F.6, p. 
3,5,9 
    
F.6, p. 
3, 5, 11 
F.6, p. 
3 
HPCRM   
F.5, 
p. 5,6 
 
F.5, 
p. 2, 
3 
F.5, p. 
4,6 
    
F.7, p. 
1, 8, 9 
F.7, p. 
8 
MA1    
F.4, 
p.5,7 
       
F.4, p. 
5, 7, 9 
SCBD   
F.8, 
p. 8,9 
        
F.9, p. 
2, 4, 5 
Etc. … … …. … … … … … … … … … 
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